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iv.

FACTS
In this brief. Salt Lake City's Innkeeper's License
Tax will be referred to as "Innkeeper Tax", Salt Lake City will
be referred to as "SLC", Little America Hotel Corporation will
be referred to as "LAHCO", Utah Hotel Company will be referred
to as "Hotel Utah", and Appellants will jointly be referred to
as "Hotels".

The class subject to the Innkeeper Tax will be

referred to as "Innkeepers".
SLC recognizes that all disputed facts on this appeal
from a summary judgment should be viewed in a light most favorable
to Hotels. Hotels believe SLC has not applied that rule in paragraphs
6 and 7 of its Statement of the Case and Facts.
at 6 & 7 ) .

(Brief of SLC

The Affidavit of Merrill Norman establishes that

the SLC International Airport is operated under an enterprise
fund of SLC, which is separate from SLC's general fund.

He also

disputed SLC's statement that the airport expansion uniquely
benefits Innkeepers.

(Affidavit of Merrill Norman, f4-8, R. 812-

813).
Hotels find no evidence in the record that any increase
in the cost of city government is due to expanded commercial
and visitor service demands.

Also, it may have been the intent

of the SLC City Council to ease the tax burden on the resident
population and more equitably share the cost of providing municipal
services to include Innkeepers and their guests who the council
1

assumed increase the cost of city government.
is evidence to contradict that assumption.

However, there

The Affidavit of

Merrill Norman, paragraph 21, establishes that LAHCO guests pay
$317.00 per year of taxes per resident-equivalent, compared to
$130.00 per resident of SLC, without considering the effect of
the Innkeeper Tax.

The Innkeeper Tax would add an additional

$139.00 per year to the tax burden of LAHCO guests per residentequivalent, bringing the tax burden on LAHCO guests to 3-1/2
times that of residents.

Also, LAHCO guests and employees have

a lower per capita rate of calls to police and to the fire department
than SLC in general.

(R. 814-817).

SU|BfARY_J)F ARGUMENT
In its brief, SLC has failed to address the appropriate
test for the legality of a city's license tax classification.
As argued in the Hotel's earlier brief, and as recently reaffirmed
by this Court in Mountain ,,Fuel Supply v. Salt i Lake City,
P. 2d _ _ ,

_

77 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1988), that test is whether there

exists a reasonable relationship between the choice to tax innkeepers
and the achievement of some legitimate legislative purpose.
As applied by this Court in cases regarding city license taxes,
including Mountain^Fuel,Supply .v. SaltnLake City, that question
of reasonableness is a question of fact to be determined by examining
the circumstances in which the tax will operate.
2

In this case,

there are issues of fact regarding whether there exist facts
which would justify a tax directed exclusively at Innkeepers
as being reasonably related to SLC's stated objective of more
equitably spreading the tax burden.

In view of LAHCO's evidence

that its guests pay more in taxes to SLC than average residents
of the city, while drawing on city services less than average
residents of the city, it was error for the trial court to grant
summary judgment to SLC on this classification issue.
SLC also lacks the power to enact a gross receipts
tax on Innkeepers.

The legislature has given that power only

to counties under the Transient Room Tax statute and to resort
cities, by allowing such cities to impose an additional 1% sales
tax.

By specifically delegating such power to counties and grantinq

to only certain cities a specific limited power to impose such
a tax, the legislature has pre-empted the field, and SLC should
not be able to infer a power to enact the Innkeeper Tax by virtue
of its general license taxing powers under Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80.
Also, the tax is a sales tax which the city cannot enact.

ARGUMENT
_

I-

THE TEST

OF THE LEGALITY OF THE INNKEEPER TAX

WHETHEJR,. THE CLASSIFICATION
O.NE _AND__B.EARS__A

TAXING ONLY INNKEEPERS I S A REASO.NABLE

REASONABLE

RELATIONSHIP

A LEGITIMATE LEGISLATIVE, PURPOSE.
r r
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TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF

The Hotels1 brief, Section I.A. argues that the appropriate
test for the legality of the Innkeeper Tax, as regards the discrimination issues raised under Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80, and Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7 is whether the classification of
Innkeepers as the only taxpayers includes all persons similarly
situated, and bears a reasonable relation to the general revenueraising purposes to be accomplished by the act.

SLC uses much

of its brief, in points I, II, and III.C. to set forth a litany
of tests formulated and stated by various courts, primarily under
the Fourteenth Amendment.

These include statements that the

party challenging a tax must negate every conceivable basis which
might support the classification

(SLC brief at 1 7 ) , that the

presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the
most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile
and oppressive discrimination (SLC brief at 18), that a successful
challenge must show that the classification is wholly without
any rational basis and is essentially arbitrary (SLC brief at
18), or that a tax is so unreasonable or oppressive as to amount
to a confiscation or destruction of the business being taxed
(SLC brief at 36).
Since the Hotels1 brief was filed, this Court has again
addressed the legality of a tax classification in a city's license
tax.

That case is Mojontain Fuel Supply Company v^^jSalt Lake

CAty^CjDrporation,

P. 2d

B

4

77 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah

S. Ct. March 9, 1988) (hereinafter

f,

Mountain„Fuel"). in

Mountain

Fujel , this Court stated that the test for compliance with Utah
Code Ann. § 10-8-80 and with Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution are the same.

That does not mean that every tax

statute or ordinance must comply with the test stated in Mountain
FueJL.

in Contijnental„Bank_ & Trust v. Farmington City, 599 P. 2d

1242, 1244-45 (Utah 1979), this Court held that taxes based on
income, occupation, licenses or franchises "are not subject to
the requirements of Article I, Section 24, of the Utah Constitution,"
and grounded its decision on Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution and on Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80.

In the case of

a city's license taxes, it is not Article I, Section 24 which
is operative, but the legislature's determination in Utah Code
Ann. § 10-8-80 to extend the uniformity requirement to license
taxes in order to limit discretion in municipal license taxation
to prevent inequitable distributions of the tax burden among
a few businesses.

It is not clear from prior cases the extent

to which Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, which
seems the right to due process, has been relied on as the source
of the reasonableness standard.
The test to be applied under Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80,
as stated in Mountain Fuel, suera is:
Whether the classification of those subject
to the legislation is a reasonable one and
bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement
of a legitimate legislative purpose. Id. at 8.
5

That test was applied by first determining the reasonableness
of the classification in the abstract, and then by determining
whether the classification bears a reasonable relationship to
the achievement of a legitimate legislative purpose.
The Hotels1 view the test as stated in Mountain Fuel
t^,rT-r-"*^r-l-rrn"-ir"" r—T~~rTr 7

as a restatement of the test argued in their earlier brief in
this case.

It is the most recent in a line of case including

Continental Bank_& Trust v. Farminqton City, supra and Weber
Basin Home Builde,rs^ssfn v. Roy City, 26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d
86 6 (1971)1, both of which were cited with approval in Mountain
Fuel.
At any rate, the appropriate test to be applied in
this case has been set forth by this Court in Mountain Fuel.
-

II.

"TnrrniiTi

mwT

iiffT-^n—

THE ISSUE WHETHER A TAX ON INNKEEPERS BEARS A

REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A LEGITIMATE LEGISLATIVE
PURPO.SE_.IS A FACTUAL ISSUE WHICH REQUIRES A TRIAL.
The Hotels argued in Section I.B. of their brief that
the issue of reasonableness of classification involves controverted
!SLC improperly characterizes Weber.Basin Home Builder^ Association
v..,,RQY.-J£ity as a regulatory case, and therefore dismisses that
case as not being applicable to a revenue-raising tax such as
is at issue here. But that case was a case involving a pure
revenue-raising tax, and this court noted that "it is conceded
that the purpose was to obtain additional money for the city's
general fund." .Id. at 216.
6

questions of fact.

Reasonableness has been treated as a factual

question in Continental Bank & Trust y. { Farmington,. Cit.y, sUJQra ,
and in Weber { Basin, Home Builders Ass'n v. Roy City, supra.^
This Court treated reasonableness as a question of fact again
in Mountain Fuel.

The opinion in Mountain Fuel refers to the

undisputed evidence that (1) the Utility Franchise Taxes account
for 20% of SLC's revenues; (2) the Public Service Commission
sets Mountain Fuel's rate of return; (3) the tax is passed directly
through to consumers, who have not switched to competing energy
sources; and (4) it would be economically inefficient to track
down and tax every supplier of coal, firewood, or bottled gas.
The other important factual determination relied on by this Court
was that
by imposing the licensing tax indirectly
on all users of telephone, electric, and
gas service, the City is able to reach those
not otherwise subject to City taxes and thereby
spread more broadly the financial burden
of providing
city services. MojLntajja_,,Fuel,
at

MBit'

9.

In Mouji^ain, Fuel, this Court noted that the standard
of scrutiny under the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80

^The Hotels also argued by analogy that the test of reasonableness
of a regulatory measure being a factual one, the test of reasonableness of a revenue measure should also be a factual one. (Hotels1
brief at 20-21). SLC argued in its brief that Hotels wrongly
base their whole argument on regulatory or impact fee cases (SLC's
brief at 27, note 7 ) . That is not the case. The regulatory
cases were cited in addition to the cases noted above as analagous,
but not identical, regarding the question of reasonableness.
7

"will always meet or exceed that mandated by the fourteenth amendment
of the U.S. Constitution."

^d,. , at 8.

The Hotels submit that

the scrutiny of license tax classifications under the Utah statute
is one of whether there is 3JiL-.JE.agt a reasonable relationship
between the class taxed and the achievement of a legitimate legislative purpose.
In Mountain .Fuel, the legitimate legislative objectives
were to raise revenue, and to do so in such a fashion as to spread
the taxpaying burden in a more fair and uniform manner than had
previously been the case.

Because the utility franchise tax

is passed through to all users of telephone, electric and gas
service, the effect of the tax was to spread the burden of that
tax very broadly, and to provide a means of taxing those institutions
which are exempt from property taxes.

So, under the undisputed

facts in Mountain Fugl, there was a reasonable relationship between
the tax on utilities, passed through to all consumers, and the
objective to spread the taxpaying burden in a more fair and uniform
manner.
The tax involved in this case is very much different.
The Innkeeper Tax is very narrowly targeted to affect only Innkeepers
and their guests, without having any effect on any others in
SLC.

However, SLC's justifications for the Innkeeper Tax are

nearly identical to those claimed for the utility franchise tax:

8

(1)

The desire to equitably spread tax burdens

to include others than property taxpayers living in the City;
( 2 ) the benefits uniquely provided to these businesses
by the City;
(3)

additional service costs generated by the

transient visitor patrons of the Innkeepers; and
(4)

the unique clientele and methods of doing

business of Innkeepers.

(Brief of SLC at 12).

The fourth justification merely relates to whether
Innkeepers can reasonably be described as a class, but not to
whether a tax on that class only is reasonably related to a legitimate
purpose.

Of the remaining justifications claimed by SLC, only

the first could be called a legislative objective—the desire
to equitably spread tax burdens to include others than property
taxpayers living in the city.

The second and third justifications

are really factual assumptions which SLC contends exist in order
to justify its conclusion that the Innkeeper Tax will more equitably
spread the tax burden.

In other words, in order for the Innkeeper

Tax to be reasonably related to the legitimate objective of equitably
spreading tax burdens, it must be true that Innkeepers receive
unique benefits from the city or generate additional service
costs for the city. SLC apparently believes that the mere incantation
of these statements is sufficient to show the legality of the
tax classification, because SLC also takes the position that
9

taxes paid by Innkeepers compared to others and the services
received by Innkeepers compared to others are irrelevant.

(SLC's

brief at 13).
The Hotels believe that in order for the Innkeeper
Tax to be upheld, there must be a reasonable relationship in
fa^ct between a tax directed only at Innkeepers and the objective
of more equitably spreading the tax burden.

SLC repeatedly and

incorrectly states that the Hotels seek to compare taxes they
pay to benefits they receive (SLC's brief at 29, 33). What the
Hotels do contend is that r in order to justify a tax directed
only at the limited class of Innkeepers as being reasonably related
to the objective of more equitably spreading the tax burden,
there must in fact be some inequity in the tax burden on Innkeepers
without the tax.

That inequity could only be one of two things:

either the taxes paid to SLC by Innkeepers and their guests are
less than the taxes paid to SLC by others, or the services provided
by SLC to Innkeepers and their guests are greater than the services
provided to others.

To justify an increase of LAHCO's license

tax by 2,300%, and an increase of the total taxes paid by LAHCO
to SLC by 42%, while holding the line on all other business license
taxes, there must be some existing inequity in the tax structure
in need of being remedied.

The Hotels don't argue for parity

between taxes paid and benefits received.

The Hotels believe

that to determine whether the choice to tax Innkeepers is reasonably
10

related to the objective of equitably spreading the tax burden,
it is appropriate to compare the taxes paid by Innkeepers and
their guests to the taxes paid by all other taxpayers, and to
compare the benefits received by Innkeepers and their guests
to the benefits received by all other taxpayers.
There is at least a factual question regarding the
existence of such an inequity as would justify the Innkeeper
tax.

LAHCO presented affidavits showing that LAHCO guests paid

$317.00 per resident-equivalent to SLC without the Innkeeper
Tax, compared with $130.00 per SLC resident.

LAHCO also presented

affidavits showing it provides its own security force, and that
calls to police from LAHCO were lower than those from SLC residents
in general, per capita, and that the same is true of calls to
the fire department.

Further, the costs of being ready to respond

to fires in high rise buildings cannot be placed only on Innkeepers,
since 59% of the hotel and motel units in SLC are in structures
of six floors or less, and hotels account for only 11.5 % of
the total floor space in high-rise buildings in SLC.
The need for a factual test of the existence of a reasonable
relationship between the class taxed and a legitimate governmental
objective can be shown by a hypothetical example, since the test
which will be applied regarding the classification of Innkeepers
will also be applied to a tax classification of any other business
in the future.

Suppose the city passed a special business license
11

tax on the gross receipts of movie theaters.

To justify the

tax, the city claims that movie theaters require more police
protection than other businesses, create a bigger fire danger
than other businesses, attract people from outside the city who
don't pay property tax to the city and uniquely benefit from
the redevelopment efforts of the city which have revitalized
the downtown area at night.

Those factors made the city decide

that, to more equitably spread the tax burden, movie theaters
should pay a business license tax 25 times as large as that paid
by any other businesses.

If the factual assumptions made by

the City in passing that tax could not be challenged for correctness,
then there is a reasonable relationship between specially taxing
movie theaters and the objective of more equitably spreading the
tax burden, even if there is no basis in fact for those assumptions.
If the uniformity provisions of the Utah Constitution
and Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 are to provide any means for preventing
unfair discrimination against a particular class of business,
in this case or any future case, there must be an available avenue
of judicial scrutiny regarding the factual assumptions made by
a city to justify a tax on that class.

This is just the higher

standard of reasonableness which can and should be required under
the Utah Constitution and under Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 to protect
businesses against unfair discrimination in business license
taxation.
12

In this case, unlike in Mountain Fuel, there is a dispute
about whether there exists any basis in fact for singling out
one particular kind of business, Innkeepers, for a special tax
far greater than the tax on any other non-utility businesses
in SLC.
III.

CLASSIFICATION CASES RELIED_ON.^BY SLC FROM OTHER

JURISDICTIONS ARE DISTINGUISHABLE,
At pages 22-24 of SLC's brief, four cases are referred
to by SLC as involving the precise issue before this Court.
That is not the case.

Edwards, v.* r City of Los. Angeles. 119 P. 2d

370 (Cal. App. 1941), involved a tax imposed on hotels and apartments.

The appellant argued that the rental of bungalows and

cottages weren't included under the ordinance, denying equal
protection.

The Court simply held that bungalows and cottages

would be included, thus avoiding the equal protection argument.
The argument made and result reached in that case were entirely
distinguishable from the present case.
City of Inglewo9d v. Ricfht, 364 P.2d 569 (Colo. 1961),
also did not involve the classification of hotels and motels.
The tax involved there taxed those in the business of renting
residential or commercial property.

The case contains no analysis

of any equal protection issues, just a reference to other cases.
508 .Chestnjjit.,^, Inc. v. iCityii9f St. Louis, 389 S.W.2d
823 (Mo. 1965), did involve a tax on Innkeepers.
13

The plaintiff

hotel made a claim of discrimination by taxing rentals to transient
and not non-transient guests.
this case.

That issue is not involved in

Also, the test applied by the Court in that case

is not compatible with the one announced by this Court as discussed
above.

And, unlike the present case, the Court specifically

mentioned that no extrinsic evidence of unreasonableness had
been introduced.
Finally, City ofMI Portsmouth v. Citizens, Trust Cc>mpany,
22 S.E.2d 532 (Va. 1976), involved a tax of 2% of gross income
of those engaged in the business of renting residential property.
The tax at issue specifically excluded hotels and motels, which
were covered by another license tax.

The Court held that it

was proper to omit hotels and motels from that tax, and to cover
them by a different tax. The Court said that the burden to establish
the unreasonableness of the tax had not been carried by the plaintiff.
This Court should not be guided by decisions or ordinances
in other jurisdictions, which revolved around different circumstances
and varying statutory and constitutional provisions, and in which
many of the arguments made were materially different from the
arguments made in this case.

This court should apply Utah law

as previously elaborated by this Court, and apply that law to
the specific facts of this case.

14

IV.

THE UTAH LEGISLATURE HAS NOT GRANTED , TO CITIES

THE POWER TO LEVY A TRANSIENT ROOM TAX.
The city's argument that the Innkeeper Tax is not pre-empted
by other legislation appears to misapprehend the Hotel's challenge
to this ordinance.
basic.

The Hotels' argument is simpler and more

As explained in the Hotels' original brief, at 47-49,

no statute expressly vests the power to collect a transient room
tax in Utah cities.

Any inference that SLC has been granted

the power to impose the Innkeeper Tax under general statues such
as Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-80 runs afoul of the deliberate, specific
treatment given transient room taxes by the Utah Legislature.
The legislature's crafting of legislation authorizing transient
room-related taxation reflects important public policy considerations
that bear upon the collection and spending of such revenues.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-301 expressly empowers counties
to collect a transient room tax.

In similar fashion, the Utah

Legislature has addressed the potential impact of tourism on
resort communities through Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-204(8), which
empowers "a city or town in which the transient room capacity
equals or exceeds the permanent census population," i.e., a small
resort city, to "impose a sales tax of up to 1%."
Where the Utah Legislature has intended to provide
for local transient room-related taxation, it has done so in
express terms.

Nothing in these statutes grants SLC the power
15

to levy its own transient room tax.

Where the Legislature has

so carefully delineated the delegation of power to impose transient
room-related taxes, the omission of SLC from that grant should
be understood as an exclusion.

See 2A N. Singer & C. Sands,

Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.23 (4th ed. 1984).
Implying such taxing authority on the part of the city is inconsistent
with the overall legislative scheme.

It is not so much that

SLC's power to tax has been pre-empted by the state legislation;
rather, it is that the legislation has made no grant to cities
of the power to impose such a tax in the first place.

V.
SALES TAX:

THE INNKEEPER TAX MAY OPERATE AS AN IMPERMISSIBLE

THE MOUNTAIN FUEL RULING CAN BE DISTINGUISHED.

In Mountain Fuel, supra, a cased decided by this Court
subsequent to the filing of the Hotels' original brief in this
appeal, the appellants challenged the validity of SLC's utility
licensing tax ordinances.

In part, they alleged "that the tax,

although labelled an annual license tax, should more properly
be characterized as a sales or income tax, which the city was
not statutorily authorized to levy*"

^d.

Treating the utilities1

equal protection and uniformity challenges at considerable length,
see discussion supra, this Court gave short shrift to the argument
that the tax in question in Moui^t:ain Fuel was an invalid sales
or income tax:
16

Mountain Fuel makes another argument: that
the tax should be characterized as an income
or sales tax. There is no reason to give
extended treatment to this claim; it is without
merit, ^d., 77 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9.
This Court did not elaborate upon the basis for rejecting the
challenge, other than to reiterate the city's defense that "the
tax cannot be viewed as an unauthorized sales or income tax . . .
simply because the amount of the tax is determined by the vendor's
gross billings."

^Id., 77 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6.

Because the license tax ordinance challenged in Mountain
Fue.1 is similar in language and effect to the Innkeeper Tax now
before this Court, it may well be argued that the result in Mountain
Fuel should control here.

However, as discussed supra. this

tax does not reach beneficiaries of "all municipal services,
including police and fire protection" who are "not otherwise
subject to other City taxes and thereby spread more broadly the
financial burden of providing City services." Icl. , 77 Utah Adv. Rep.
at 9. Taxes like the Innkeeper Tax have routinely been distinguished
from other business or license taxes by the nomenclature used
to identify them.
A tax imposed on the amount charged a transient
guest for room occupancy at a hotel, motel,
inn, or like establishment has been referred
to by the courts as a bed tax, a hotel or
motel room tax, an accommodation tax, a transient
room tax, a room occupancy tax, a tourist
room tax, a tourist development tax, or an
occupancy tax.
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Annot., Tax o^ Hotel-Motel Room Occupapcv, 58 A.L.R. 4th 274,
281-82 (1987).

As the Annotation explains, the nomenclature

reflects the "diverse judicial view of the tax, which has been
held under various circumstances to be a sales tax. . ., privilege
tax . . . , a license tax . . ., an income tax . . ., or an excise
tax . . . "

I_d. at 282 (emphasis added & citations omitted).

See also Montana Innkeeper Association

iiiv.iiiBillinas,

671 P. 2d

21 (Mont. 1983) ($1 per day transient room tax held to be impermissible sales tax).
That the Innkeeper Tax may be considered a sales tax
finds support in the fact that the Utah Legislature has granted
express authority to county governments to levy a "Transient
Room Tax" as part of the "Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax Act,"
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-201, et seq.

This reflects a legislative

view that transient room taxes similar in substance to the Innkeeper
Tax are properly classified with other local sales and use taxes,
rather than under separate business licensing powers.
CONCLBSUQN
SLC has not addressed the appropriate standard by which
the validity of the Innkeeper Tax is to be determined.

That

test, as recently reiterated by this Court in the M^ntain, Fuel
case, is whether there exists a reasonable relationship between
the class taxed and a legitimate governmental purpose; in this
case, a revenue-raising purpose.
18

The Hotels submit that the

test to be applied under the Utah Constitution and statutes is
whether there is in fact such a reasonable relationship, and
a trial is necessary to determine that factual issue.

In view

of the factual issues raised, the trial courtfs award of summary
judgment to SLC was in error.

Appellant Hotels respectfully

request that the summary judgment granted by the trial court
on the issue of the legality of the classification of Innkeepers
as the only class subject to the Innkeeper Tax be vacated and
that this case be remanded to the trial court for a trial on
those issues.

For the reasons stated in the previous brief of

appellants, it is requested that the Court rule that the trial
court's protective order prohibiting discovery of taxes paid
by Innkeepers to SLC was an abuse of discretion.

That order

should be vacated and the trial court should be instructed upon
remand to allow discovery of that relevant factual information.
In addition, this Court is asked to determine that
the legislature has not empowered SLC to impose this tax, because
such power cannot be implied from general license tax power in
view of the specific grant of authority by the legislature to
counties to impose transient room taxes and to small resort cities
to impose an additional 1% sales tax where transient room capacity
exceeds permanent population.

Finally, SLC lacks power to impose

the Innkeeper Tax because it is in fact a sales tax beyond the
city's power to impose.

If SLC has no power to impose the Innkeeper
19

Tax, the summary judgment for the City should be reversed and
the summary judgment sought by the Hotels should be entered.
Respectfully submitted this

% ^ day of April, 1988.

RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP

6-A—
Lon Rodney Kump
David J. Bird
Attorneys for Little America
Hotel Corporation
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
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Dorothy C. Pleshe
Russell C. Kearl
Attorneys for Utah Hotel Company
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